Michel Le Breton

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Group Formation with Heterogeneous Feasible Sets”, in Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency: Essays in Honor of Birgit Grodal, Christian Schultz, and Karl Vind (eds.), Springer Verlag, chapter 16, March 2006, pp. 295–315.

Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, and Michel Le Breton, “Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 126, n. 1, January 2006, pp. 194–234.

Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Transfers in a Polarized Country : Bridging the Gap between Efficiency and Stability”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, n. 7, July 2005, pp. 1277–1303.

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation”, in Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Gabrielle Demange, and Myrna Wooders (eds.), Cambridge University Press, chapter 8, March 2005, pp. 266–287.

Didier Laussel, and Michel Le Breton, “Favors for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection”, Annals of Economics and Finance, Peking University Press, n. 6, 2005, pp. 53–73.

Michel Le Breton, “Georges A. Bordes”, Économie Publique, n. 16, 2005, pp. 179–192.

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton, “The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems”, in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, Essays in Honor of Jeff Banks, David Austen-Smith, and John Duggan (eds.), Springer Verlag, series “Studies in Choice and Welfare”, 2005, pp. 163–199.

Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev, and Shlomo Weber, “The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in the Provision of Public Goods”, Economics Bulletin, n. 8, 2005, pp. 1–5.

G. Bordes, P. J. Hammond, and Michel Le Breton, “Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 7, n. 1, 2005, pp. 1–25.

Michel Le Breton, “On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs”, Économie Publique, vol. 17, n. 2, 2005, pp. 187–195.

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets”, Economic Theory, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 25, n. 1, January 2005, pp. 187–201.

Jacques Dreze, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Secession-Proofness in Large Heterogeneous Societies”, Économie Publique, vol. 17, n. 2, 2005, pp. 197–220.

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton, “Equilibrium Agenda Formation”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23, n. 1, August 2004, pp. 21–57.

Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Voluntary Formation of Communities for the Provision of Public Projects”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, n. 1, March 2004, pp. 1–34.

Michel Le Breton, and François Salanié, “Lobbying under Political Uncertainty”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 87, n. 12, 2003, pp. 2589–2610.

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 50, 2003, pp. 403–435.

Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, and Michel Le Breton, “Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 103, 2002, pp. 88–105.

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton, “Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy in Committees”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 103, 2002, pp. 190–218.

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession?”, IMF Staff Papers, n. 01/176, November 2001.

Didier Laussel, and Michel Le Breton, “Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency ”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 100, 2001, pp. 93–128.